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Abstract I argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social attachments 
to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, when we trust or distrust someone, 
we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we 
are concerned about in matters of trust is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to that 
individual, or to the group of which they are a member. We have this concern as a result of a drive to form secure 
social attachments. This makes us vulnerable in the characteristic way of being susceptible to betrayal, because 
how the other acts in such matters can demonstrate our lack of worth to them, or to the group, thereby threatening 
the security of our attachment, and eliciting the reactive attitudes characteristic of betrayal. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social 
attachments to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, 
when we trust or distrust someone, we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than 
merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we are concerned about in matters of trust 
is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to that individual, or to the 
group of which they are a member. We have this concern as a result of a drive to form secure 
social attachments. This makes us vulnerable in the characteristic way of being susceptible to 
betrayal, because how the other acts in such matters can demonstrate our lack of worth to them, 
or to the group, thereby threatening the security of our attachment, and eliciting the reactive 
attitudes characteristic of betrayal. 
 
I defend the account as follows: in §1 I outline how an account of the vulnerability of trust 
should explain the characteristic interpersonal importance, rather than mere practical or 
instrumental importance, of matters of trust. In §2, I outline how three prominent accounts of 
trust – those of Annette Baier (1986), Richard Holton (1994) and Katherine Hawley (2014) – 
have sought to explain that importance, and how ultimately Hawley’s ‘commitment’ account 
appears best suited. In §3, I raise problem a type of problem case for the commitment account, 
using this to show why the commitment account is more generally inadequate as an account of 
the characteristic vulnerability of trust. In §4, I outline the shape of the attachment account, 
illustrating how it sheds light on the nature of betrayal. In §5, I use the account to explain the 
problem cases raised against the accounts of trust discussed in §2 and §3. In §6, I address a 
possible objection to the attachment account; that it focuses too much on trust in intimate 
relationships. Finally, in §7, I use it to help explain how it is true that distrust can be betrayed. 
 
 
 
 2 
1. Seeking an account of the vulnerability of trust 
 
What is it to trust or to distrust someone? Following Annette Baier, many authors agree that 
trust is fundamentally about accepting vulnerability, in some sense, to another’s possible 
(in)action (Baier 1986 p. 235). Many also connect the concept of vulnerability at issue, to the 
possibility of being betrayed or let down.1 This is as opposed to simply having one’s goals 
frustrated from relying on the unreliable. The trust/betrayal connection is, of course, one of the 
reasons that trust is interesting: it is an attitude where we cast others in a moral or ethical light, 
but in an up-close-and-personal way; not simply praising or blaming. If I disappoint your trust, 
you can feel wronged by me. But it can also be true that objectively I did not wrong you, for 
perhaps you shouldn’t have expected it of me to do otherwise. Trust and distrust spark a proto-
moral response toward others, and it may be that, given how systems of moral norms appear to 
be influenced from the bottom up by trust relationships,2 gaining a deeper understanding of 
why this is so, would help shed light on what moral judgements are about more generally. 
 
The connection between matters of trust and betrayal is obvious. Some authors though are also 
quick to note that distrust, not just trust, can also be betrayed (Hawley 2014 p. 13; Hieronymi 
2008 p. 229).3 On this basis it seems that trust and distrust share a common moralising 
‘content’. Both attitudes leave their bearers vulnerable to being betrayed or at least let down, 
where this is a sort of interpersonal harm: a diminishing of our wellbeing at the actions of 
another. It follows that an account of the vulnerability of trust should also furnish us with an 
account of the vulnerability of distrust. And because betrayal seems to be the key notion in 
accounting for that vulnerability, an account of the vulnerability of trust and distrust should 
explain why they are attitudes that make us able to be betrayed, not simply frustrated. 
 
How do we explain the vulnerability of (dis)trust: the ability to be betrayed, or ‘betrayability’? 
What is true of a (dis)trustor that makes them betrayable? We need to first be clear on a key 
explanatory demand of an account of betrayability. An account of betrayability must capture 
the characteristic concern we have about the way others may act, when we trust or distrust. By 
concern, I mean roughly the kind of interest we have in, or the sense of importance we bestow 
on, how someone proceeds to act, in a matter of trust. This is the sort of concern that manifests 
in feelings and accusations of betrayal, should expectations be disappointed. 
 
1 In what follows, I’ll generally refer to betrayal in particular as the harm of disappointed trust. This 
should be taken as shorthand for other harms of the lesser degree, like being let down, that are in the 
same realm of ‘personal’ harms. Betrayal is simply the flag-bearer for this family of harms enabled by 
trusting or distrusting. 
2 E.g. in moral systems like those in religious cults, or the Mafia’s ‘Omertà’, there is a code of not 
betraying others in the community to those outside of it, e.g. to the authorities of the nation state. These 
systems of norms tend to endorse immoral action overall, but they are sustained by the proto-morality 
of trust and distrust relationships, deterring against betrayal. In other words, from within the 
community, it feels wrong to break those codes, even if it is objectively right for members to do so. 
3 Hawley’s example is that Jesus distrusted Judas, but Judas still betrayed Jesus. Another, more 
everyday example: you can distrust your partner in suspecting them of cheating, but still be betrayed 
when those suspicions turn out to be accurate. 
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We can of course have different kinds of concern about how others will act. As a first step, we 
need to be able to outline the relevant difference: that between just having a practical concern 
and having an interpersonal concern about how another acts.4 The following two examples 
provide a contrast to illustrate this: 
 
Predictable Flatmate: John is trying to submit an essay to a journal for a deadline 
tonight. He won’t have time to go out and buy himself some food for dinner if he 
chooses to do this. However, he knows his flatmate Elis will also be going food 
shopping himself. The food Elis puts in the shared fridge can easily be taken without 
Elis noticing. 
 
Helpful Flatmate: Maria is trying to submit an essay to a journal for a deadline tonight 
and won’t have time to go out and buy herself something for dinner. But her flatmate 
Izzy has told her not to worry, and that she will buy Maria some food, and that Maria 
can pay her back later. 
 
Predictable Flatmate is a case of simply relying on another’s acting. John has an 
instrumental/practical concern about how Elis acts; he wants to satisfy both the goals of having 
his tea and also submitting the paper. How Elis acts is instrumental in achieving both. 
 
Helpful Flatmate is a case of trusting another to act.5 Maria has a similar practical concern to 
John about Izzy’s going food shopping, but this concern also carries interpersonal, normative 
weight. It matters to Maria, in a way beyond the instrumental satisfaction of her own desires, 
how Izzy acts. Maria would be betrayed and not simply frustrated, should Izzy fail to do as she 
promises. 
 
Setting out an account of a concept is akin to giving the terms of a database search that sifts all 
candidate cases for the ones we want. A key demand of an account of trust and distrust is that 
it not ‘return’ cases where individuals have the wrong kind of concern about another’s acting. 
It must only be true of cases where individuals exhibit the interpersonal import of trust and 
distrust. It mustn’t return us counterexamples, where the conditions we provide are also true of 
non-trustors. 
 
4 Baier (1986) raises a number of such contrast cases. One is based on the folklore surrounding Kant’s 
regularity in his daily routine. Kant’s neighbours would – the story goes – rely on him for their own 
timekeeping. If Kant decided to take his walk at a different time one day, they might be surprised, and 
frustrated in their goals. But they would not feel betrayed by Kant. The case also supports the intuition 
at hand that, intuitively, there is an interpersonal concern about matters of trust, not just a practical 
concern. 
5 The Helpful Flatmate case can be turned into a case of distrust, if we imagine that Izzy is notoriously 
unhelpful or outright deceitful, such that Maria has some hesitance about taking her up on the promise 
of help. In that case, Maria would still have the same interpersonal concern in her attitude toward Izzy’s 
possible acting, but it would now carry a pessimistic anticipation of non-fulfilment. 
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2. Baier’s ‘reliance on goodwill’ account 
 
Baier’s own account of the betrayability of trust as ‘reliance on another’s goodwill toward one’ 
(1986 p. 235) seems to get us the correct search terms for trust, on the face of it. It seems right 
to say that when Maria takes up Izzy’s promise to buy her food for the night, she is forced to 
rely on Izzy’s goodwill toward Maria. Perhaps, then, ‘reliance on another’s goodwill’ captures 
the interpersonal concern of matters of trust. 
 
Holton (1994), however points out that the ‘reliance on goodwill’ account of trust is susceptible 
to a counterexample. It returns some cases of the wrong type. The counterexample it returns is 
the ‘confidence trickster’ (1994 p. 65). Confidence tricksters typically elicit sympathy from 
marks, in order to procure instrumentally beneficial behaviour from them. For example, 
imagine a variant of the Helpful Flatmate case where Maria simply lies to Izzy about having 
deadlines to hit, and being too poor to pay her back for now. It seems true in that case that 
Maria still relies on Izzy’s goodwill toward her. But it isn’t true that Maria trusts Izzy, except 
perhaps in some deviant sense of trust (she maybe ‘trusts’ her gullibility). Thus, we need a 
better account of betrayability, than the ‘reliance on goodwill’ account.  
 
 
2.1 The participant stance and commitment accounts 
 
Holton’s own account of trust is that it is reliance from a ‘participant stance’ (1994 pp. 67–8). 
The participant stance is in the spirit of Strawson’s participant attitude; the kind of regard we 
take toward others when we appraise their actions in a moral way; according them e.g. praise 
or blame (Strawson 1974 pp. 5–6). Yet, we sometimes regard others in a way that involves 
treating them more like machines or instruments. In such cases we do not have reactive 
attitudes toward others, so do not have a participant stance toward them. 
 
Holton suggests that the ‘reliance plus participant stance’ account avoids the confidence 
trickster case. The confidence trickster merely relies on you as he would an instrument. Thus, 
he does not have reactive attitudes toward you when you fail to fall for his trick, so frustrating 
his reliance. He does not take a participant stance toward you, and this is why we can say he 
does not trust you. 
 
Hawley (2014), however, suggests that while reliance from a participant stance is necessary 
for trust, it is insufficient for it. Plugging in the participant stance to our database search terms 
does not adequately narrow down the results. This is because, Hawley argues, we can rely on 
others from a participant stance, so be disposed to reactive attitudes, yet not be disposed to 
betrayal in particular. The example she offers is of one side of a romantic partnership (X) 
coming to rely on the other (Y) to cook dinner. It may be appropriate for X to express gratitude 
to Y, about Y cooking X’s dinner. Yet there is something else needed for it to be appropriate 
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for X to feel betrayed in case Y does not cook dinner (Hawley 2014 pp. 7–8). A participant 
stance is therefore not enough to make this a matter of trust.  
 
Hawley’s positive account is that trust and distrust involve reliance and non-reliance 
(respectively) on another to fulfil a normative commitment to acting (2014 pp. 10–2). A 
supposition of the other having made a commitment – akin to a promise – enables betrayal. 
This explains what our intuitions about the cooking dinner case hinge on. When Y makes a 
commitment to cook dinner, X can appropriately feel betrayed in case this does not happen. 
Absent commitment, it can be appropriate for X to express gratitude if dinner is cooked, but 
not betrayal if it is not cooked. Our inclination to label the case as one of X trusting Y, seems 
to hinge on the presence of a commitment by Y. Furthermore, the commitment account 
explains what is missing in the confidence trickster case. The mark does not make a genuine 
commitment to acting, so it is not appropriate for the confidence trickster to feel betrayal. This 
accounts for why he does not trust the mark. 
 
What we seem to have with the commitment account is a robust account of the vulnerability of 
trust and distrust: we are able to be betrayed when others have made commitments to acting. 
Furthermore, an attractive feature of Hawley’s account is that allows that commitments can be 
implicit; incurred or generated through roles, circumstances, mutual expectation and 
convention, unless we explicitly warn others not to rely on us (2014 p. 11). This helps explain 
why we can have disputes about whether some (in)action was genuinely a betrayal or not: we 
may dispute whether a commitment was ever made. Matters of trust can be fuzzy, and the 
commitment account is well placed to explain this. 
 
 
3. What the commitment account leaves wanting 
 
Is this the end of the road for our account of the vulnerability of trust? I argue that our 
understanding is still lacking. For one: what is left out from the commitment account is an 
explanation for why commitments matter to us in a way that enables betrayal. Certainly, there 
seems to be a tight co-variance relationship between the presence of commitment, and the 
presence of betrayability. But this is not as tight as we might think. There are cases where our 
trust, and so our betrayability, and the actual commitment made by another and accepted by 
us, come apart. 
 
This passage from Judith Herman’s ‘Trauma and Recovery’ helps illustrate the present point: 
 
The imagery of [traumatic] events often crystallises around a moment of betrayal, and 
it is this breach of trust which gives the intrusive images their intense emotional power. 
For example, in Abram Kardiner’s psychotherapy of the navy veteran who had been 
rescued at sea after his ship was sunk, the veteran became most upset when revealing 
how he had felt let down by his own side: “The patient became rather excited and began 
to swear profusely; his anger aroused clearly by incidents connected with his rescue. 
They had been in the water for a period of about twelve hours when a torpedo-boat 
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destroyer picked them up. Of course the officers in the lifeboats were taken off first. 
The eight or nine men clinging to the raft the patient was on had to wait in the water 
for six or seven hours longer until help came.” 
The officers had been rescued first, even though they were already relatively safe in the 
lifeboats, while the enlisted men hanging onto the raft were passed over, and some of 
them drowned as they awaited rescue. Though Kardiner accepted this procedure as part 
of the normal military order, the patient was horrified at the realization that he was 
expendable to his own people. The rescuer’s disregard for the man’s life was more 
traumatic to him than were the enemy attack, the physical pain of submersion in the 
cold water, the terror of death, and the loss of the other men who shared his ordeal. 
(Herman 2001 p. 55) 
 
In this case, the procedure to rescue officers first was an express commitment (or a consequence 
of one) from the veteran’s side, that he understood. Yet regardless of what had been explicitly 
communicated, the veteran trusted his side to rescue him. The feeling of betrayal he 
experienced when his side in fact followed through on their commitment, was vivid and 
traumatising. What this demonstrates is that the connection between trust, commitment, and 
betrayability, is looser than we need it to be, if the commitment account is to explain the 
vulnerability of matters of trust. We can be betrayable on a matter in spite of the other’s 
commitment to some opposed action that we, as trustors, accept. 
 
Similar cases can be raised. Imagine a casual ‘no-strings attached’ sexual relationship between 
two people, who both agree that each has no commitment to be faithful to the other. In such 
cases, it’s commonplace that despite a recognised lack of commitments to being faithful, 
feelings of betrayal can easily result on one or both sides, when it becomes clear that one or 
both sides have seen other people. The vulnerability of trust – betrayability – can come about 
despite a lack of a commitment on the others’ part. 
 
How might we respond to these cases, in defence of the commitment account? It cannot be 
denied that the feelings of betrayal by the subjects are genuine. Could it be denied that they are 
cases of trust, such that some other attitude is betrayed? This would be a stretch. If anything 
can be betrayed, it surely indicates that whatever was betrayed, was a matter of trust. This is 
regardless of whether either party was previously aware of that being the case.6 
 
What we could deny is that the actions that violated the trust in these cases were genuine 
betrayals. This is because, perhaps, a genuine normatively binding commitment does not hold 
in these cases. There is a crucial distinction between betrayal qua feeling/reactive attitude, and 
 
6 Matters of trust can of course be unconscious or unrecognised. Several authors note this kind of trust 
is required for being able to live comfortably in communities e.g. (Thomas 1989 p. 34), and is the sort 
of trust shattered in unanticipated or previously unthinkable violations of trust. Jones (2004) for 
example argues this kind of trust is what the power of terror attacks depends upon. In the casual 
relationship example, it might be that one party didn’t even realise they regarded the other’s fidelity as 
a matter of trust, until the betrayal is felt. 
 7 
betrayal qua form of action. These can come apart. These are cases where the feeling results, 
but not where the action has occurred. The commitment account explains vulnerability to the 
action type of betrayal but not the feeling type. 
 
But this response reveals why the commitment account is inadequate as an account of the 
vulnerability of trust. We are looking for an account of what gives trust its characteristic 
betrayability in terms of the reactive attitude. We are not seeking an account of when our 
reactive attitude was also the result of an action that the other can be blameworthy for. That is 
what the commitment account provides, but that doesn’t unpack for us why the attitude of trust 
makes us susceptible to that proto-moralising reactive attitude. We’re interested in what the 
psychology of trustors is that makes them susceptible to feel betrayed, in a way that is not true 
of e.g. John’s regard of Elis in the predictable flatmate case, or Holton’s confidence trickster. 
Those subjects’ psychological make-up is distinct from comparable trustors in a way we seek 
to explain. Focusing solely on trustors whose trust is in some sense well-founded, warranted, 
or appropriate, is to miss what is at issue. We seek to explain the vulnerability of trust full-stop. 
 
A related problem arises if we try to respond that in these cases there were implicit 
commitments that held. The response goes, these are not counterexamples to the commitment 
account: what we have are trustees betraying their implicit commitments to trustors. Implicit 
commitments are of course what Hawley supposes we can incur if we are not careful (2014 p. 
11). These make it possible for us to betray others’ trust, and to do so in a morally problematic 
way, even when we never made a corresponding explicit commitment. 
 
However, there are several problems with this response, as a way of explaining away these 
cases. Fundamentally, it appears to be ad hoc. These are cases where we would have to suppose 
that just because a trustor trusts, there must be an implicit commitment the trustee holds. But 
this isn’t what we want to suppose. We want to allow cases where trust is based on nothing that 
the trustee did to encourage it. We want to allow for groundless or unwarranted trust, and also 
allow that with such trust, trustors are open to a sort of vulnerability in being able to be 
betrayed, just not a betrayal the trustee can be blamed for. 
 
On the implicit commitment line of response, we would also have to suppose that, in these 
cases, the trustees somehow have conflicting commitments. They would have explicit 
commitments to one course of action, and implicit commitments to the opposite course of 
action. But the explicit commitments are what disavow them of the implicit ones. Those 
explicit commitments are meant to let them off the hook. It seems right that the explicit 
commitments have indeed served that function, because the trustees cannot be held accountable 
as having betrayed the trustor, in a morally problematic way. This is so even though the trustor 
was still vulnerable to the trustee. Again, the problem is in the commitment account’s confusing 
betrayability qua being the patient of another’s morally blameworthy action, with betrayability 
qua susceptibility to a type of feeling or reactive attitude. 
 
Finally, we can consider the more simplistic response, that the trustors in these cases have a 
mistaken belief that the other party has a commitment, in respect of what they later feel has 
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been betrayed. In the veteran case, there is the mistaken belief that his side has a commitment 
to rescuing him. In the no-strings-attached sexual relationship, there is the mistaken belief that 
there are strings. Note that this is a distinct response to imputing implicit commitments. That 
response says there is a genuine betrayal that has taken place. On this response we suppose no 
genuine betrayal has taken place, but the trustors believe that it has. 
 
But this response mis-describes the cases. The veteran was under no illusions about what his 
side had committed to, and neither are the partners about each other. Yet the sense of betrayal 
is real. The trustors are betrayable in spite of the commitments (or lack of) that they themselves 
recognise the trustees to have made. 
 
 
4. The positive account: attachment concern 
 
The account of the vulnerability inherent in matters of trust I want to propose is meant to 
explain both how trustee commitments typically elicit vulnerability to betrayal in trustors, and 
also how commitments and that vulnerability can become misaligned (as in the above example 
cases). This is because underneath commitments there is a more basic concern we have about 
others, which everyday commitments interact with. 
 
Matters of trust and distrust are fundamentally concerned with, or about, our need for secure 
attachments. Particular matters of trust are emblematic of, or stand in for, the potential for the 
security of these attachments to be put in question. This is what gives matters of trust a 
characteristic betrayability: when we trust someone on a matter, and she disappoints that trust, 
we not only are practically disappointed, but the security of our attachment to her, or to the 
group we both are members of, is shaken. In other words, trust and distrust are attitudes we 
have in response to a kind of vulnerability we possess as social beings, that feel a need to be 
close to others, and to belong in groups. 
 
The concept of attachment comes from developmental psychology and earlier 20th century 
psychoanalysis. In developmental psychology, Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) and Ainsworth 
(1969) used the concept to characterise the emotional bond that children and caregivers form, 
such that the continued presence of the caregiver is a matter of emotional wellbeing for the 
child. 
 
Bowlby’s studies of attachment centred on a scenario called the ‘strange situation’. The strange 
situation involves observation of a child playing in a room, in close proximity to her caregiver. 
The caregiver then leaves the room, and a stranger enters. After a time of being left in the 
stranger’s presence, generating uncertainty and wariness on the child’s part, the caregiver re-
enters the room. From observing different ways children respond to the caregiver upon re-
entering, Bowlby and Ainsworth theorise that a child’s way of responding manifests different 
methods of securing the continued proximity of caregivers and/or of coping with felt needs for 
caregivers. In most cases (in healthy, or secure styles) this involves approaching the caregiver 
for reassurance, to secure continued proximity in future. In other cases, the child admonishes 
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the caregiver for leaving, and in still others, chooses to ignore or give the ‘silent treatment’ to 
the caregiver. 
 
 
4.1 Attachment as a more general phenomenon 
 
The concept of attachment, which I’m claiming explains the vulnerability of trust, has its root 
in the concept outlined by Bowlby and Ainsworth. However, I am applying the concept of 
attachment more broadly to describe the ongoing felt need for the presence of other people, 
and for assurance of their non-instrumental concern about us, that persists throughout life.7 In 
this respect, this more general concept of attachment takes its core meaning from the 
phenomenon outlined in Bowlby and Ainsworth’s attachment theory. But it also applies to 
matters of trust more generally. Matters of trust in the adult world, in the various of domains 
of interaction we have with others, are, in a sense, Bowlby’s ‘strange situation’, writ large. 
 
Wonderly (2016) puts forward a philosophical account of attachment that is fit for present 
purpose. Wonderly outlines “security-based attachment” as a rich “mode of mattering”. She 
suggests “that the relevant form of attachment involves a felt need for its object and particular 
relationship between the object and the attached agent’s sense of security.” Furthermore, this 
is a distinct attitude “from the more philosophically familiar notion of caring.” (2016 p. 223). 
Wonderly summarises the core concept as follows: 
 
In this form of attachment, the agent experiences a particular object as a felt need, such 
that her senses of well-being and general competence suffer without it. Unlike caring, 
this attitude is largely self-focused and marked by an integral connection between its 
object and the agent’s felt security. (2016 p. 224) 
 
Attachment is, like caring, a mental phenomenon implicated centrally in things mattering to 
us. But attachment involves a mode of mattering that is stronger than caring about something. 
Attachment is related to our proper functioning and wellbeing. As such, when we are attached 
to someone, this is not merely a matter of desiring the presence of the person (as per the folk-
psychological concept of desire) or simply caring about her. As Wonderly emphasises above, 
attachment involves a self-focused concern for the continued presence of the object. It is not 
that we necessarily care about the other person, rather that we need her. When our felt need for 
another is so strong, we can in fact fail to display care about her; being so focused on our own 
need of her, that she is neglected as a result. This can give rise to goal-directed activity to secure 
her continued presence, when this is felt to be under threat. Precursors to this activity are 
glimpsed in children, in the caregiver proximity-maintaining behaviour that Bowlby and 
Ainsworth highlight. Wonderly summarises the overall result succinctly: “in virtue of (what I 
 
7 The exception may be those with psychopathic traits, who have a largely instrumental concern about 
contact with other people. One could armchair-speculate that this may be connected to why so few 
psychopaths can treat interactions with others as matters of trust, and why interactions with psychopaths 
are marked by manipulation and exploitation (cf. Bosmans et al. 2010; Mikulincer & Shaver 2012). 
 10 
feel as though is) my need [for the attachment object], I am tugged this way and that” (2016 p. 
228). 
 
This concept of attachment helps characterise how, post-childhood, the relationships we have 
with others are tied to our sense of wellbeing and felt security. Those of us with an attachment 
concern have a disposition to form social bonds, and need close relationships, e.g. friends, 
family, romantic partners. 
 
The strong relationship between trust and attachment also finds support in cases of individuals 
with William’s Syndrome (WS), who are ‘pathologically trusting’. Such individuals find it 
difficult to distrust others, and are driven to approach strangers with the level of affection 
reserved for close friends (Dobbs 2007; Doyle et al. 2004; Järvinen-Pasley et al. 2008; Moseley 
2014). Empirical evidence suggests that this results from a lessened ability to detect threat of 
deception or ill will in facial expressions (Ng et al. 2015; Riby et al. 2014), such that WS 
individuals don’t have the necessary competing evidence of untrustworthiness to temper a 
strong drive for social approach. Such individuals also appear to have heightened levels of 
oxytocin – the hormone implicated in affiliative attachment (mother/child, romantic partners, 
friends etc.) – when around others, as a result (Dai et al. 2012). Ng et al. (2015), though, note 
that WS individuals are able to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals 
when reflecting on abstract examples of behaviour.  
 
Overall, WS individuals suggest that the extent to which we trust others is guided by an 
attachment drive. When this drive goes unchecked to a greater extent – i.e. when the 
mechanism for relaying evidence of social threat is impeded – then the scope of secure 
attachment expands. It would follow that matters of trust expand in scope, if trust is a positive 
sense of secure attachment.8 
 
 
4.2 Disrupted attachment is at the heart of experienced betrayals 
 
The experience of a child left in the ‘strange situation’, who then seeks assurance from a 
returned caregiver, has echoes in the adult experience of disappointed trust. We can see this by 
reflecting on what the experience of betrayal more generally is like. Remarkably, even though 
authors focusing on trust often note the connection with betrayal, it is rare to find a sustained 
treatment of betrayal in the literature. Two exceptions are Jackson (2000) and Shklar (1984), 
 
8 This needn’t entail that WS individuals expand the scope of matters of trust in the sense of trusting 
others to perform specific actions beyond perceived competence (e.g. suddenly trusting you to be able 
to fix the boiler, despite having no indication you can). It does mean WS individuals are comfortable 
with others beyond affiliative/emotional intimacy boundaries non-WS individuals ordinarily adhere 
to, since those are a function of attachment security. In an unfortunate irony, this purportedly makes it 
harder for WS individuals to build close relationships (Dobbs 2007), because sensitivity to the dance 
of mutually expanding and contracting affiliative boundaries is needed to nurture intimate 
relationships. 
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who both note that literature and history, rather than philosophy, are more fruitful in attempting 
to understand the nature of betrayal (dramatic fiction and non-fiction, high or low brow, tends 
to revolve around the dynamics of trust and betrayal). Both also offer their own useful 
characterisations of the nature of betrayal. Here I focus on Shklar’s, which draws on dictionary 
definitions of betrayal, in order to paint a vivid picture of the emotional turmoil that 
accompanies it:9 
 
Betrayal […] is to place another person “in the power of an enemy, by treachery or 
disloyalty,” and also “to prove false to, to disappoint the hopes or expectations of.” This, 
I think, should include breaking an appointment that means much to the other person, 
neglecting those who depend on our care, and talking maliciously about our friends. […] 
There is, as the dictionary does show us, an irreducible experience in betrayal: desertion. 
That brings into play the greatest of childhood anxieties, the fear of abandonment. In 
quitting a bonded group, an equally primeval fear is stirred: of the failure to distinguish 
kin and stranger, the latter almost always called “enemy” as well. To reject a blood 
relationship for a new and alien association, or for none at all, is to deny the most 
elementary of social ties. (Shklar 1984 p. 139) 
 
Shklar points out that, at the core experience of betrayal, there lies neglect and abandonment. 
To feel a betrayal is to perceive abandonment by the other. This can spur responses of outrage, 
confusion and so on. The characteristic sting of betrayal is, at root, the sting of being rejected 
by someone, and so ostracised from the group. This is attachment disruption laid bare. 
Someone who doesn’t have such an attachment need, such that it cannot be elicited by promises 
or expressed commitments from others, is not betrayable. We simply would not be able to 
experience the sting of rejection if we felt no need to belong to a group. To lack this need would 
amount to a kind of social invulnerability. 
 
Betrayal and abandonment, as Shklar’s illustration points out, have the threat of desertion as 
their focus. Putting the concept of social attachment at the heart of matters of trust, explains 
why trust and distrust carry the threat of betrayal, and not just disappointed goals. The kind of 
agent that can trust or distrust in the way we do, is the kind of agent that forms attachments, 
and is then prone to attitudes that are geared toward preservation of attachments. Others can 
 
9 Jackson’s account is similar to Shklar’s, in focusing on the trustor’s violated expectation of loyalty 
and non-instrumental concern from a trustee, despite trustee assurances to the contrary. He gives an 
example from Sense and Sensibility: Willoughby’s withdrawal from his relationship with Marianne, 
which – Jackson argues – is technically an abandonment, rather than a betrayal. However, we should 
resist the move of drawing a clear distinction between betrayal and abandonment (which, to motivate 
the attachment account, I want to suggest are roughly synonymous). It seems reasonable that Marianne 
would experience Willoughby’s abandonment as a betrayal of trust. To give a comparable example, 
imagine a close friend one day refuses to speak to you with no explanation, and never again initiates 
contact. This is an abandonment of the relationship, but also would give rise to feelings of betrayal, 
insofar as continued contact, and explanation of any withdrawal, is part of what one cares about in a 
friendship. 
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threaten the security of those attachments by displaying our seeming lack of worth to them, or 
to the group. They can display that lack of worth in their actions toward us: showing that they 
do not care about the fact that we care about whatever matter they disappoint us on. This carries 
the realisation that we cannot count on the other to look out for us. 
 
That is the general form of the account of the particular vulnerability of matters of trust I argue 
for. How does the attachment account help where the commitment account was lacking? The 
key issue with the commitment account was that it focused on what is required for trustees to 
be culpable for betrayals, not on what trustor vulnerability to betrayal consists in. In the next 
section, I use the attachment account to resolve the difficulties that faced the commitment 
account. First, though, I put it to work in shedding more light on the ‘confidence trickster’ case 
– why the trickster does not trust the mark – that does not require us to appeal to the 
‘bindingness’ of the mark’s commitment to the trickster, as the commitment account did. 
 
 
5. Explaining the confidence trickster and misaligned commitment cases 
 
Recall the confidence trickster case. The trickster has an instrumental interest in the mark’s 
action, insofar as it would help the trickster. The trickster doesn’t have a vulnerability that is 
characteristic of trustors. The mark failing to fall for the con doesn’t amount to a rejection of 
the trickster, because the trickster didn’t make himself vulnerable in the way he could be 
rejected. This avoidance of social vulnerability is an aspect of his manipulative behaviour: he 
manoeuvres outside of the group, being parasitic on it, but not participating in it, in a way that 
could then make him vulnerable to being rejected from it. 
 
Furthermore, the explanation for why the trickster is not betrayable qua reactive attitude, isn’t 
that the mark fails to make a genuine binding commitment. This is the explanation the 
commitment account resorted to. But this puts the cart before the horse. It is actually the case 
that the mark’s commitment being non-binding is partly the result of the trickster not being 
betrayable qua reactive attitude; by the trickster not caring in the manner of a trustor about 
whether the mark acts as promised. Commitments bind, partly because of the possibility of 
causing a sense of betrayal, should they not be fulfilled. 
 
For instance, commitments that are about things the other simply doesn’t care about, do not 
bind. Imagine that your colleague promises to bring you a CD of his new self-produced album, 
because he is under the misapprehension that you really care about hearing it. But you don’t 
care about this at all.10 The expressed commitment your colleague makes is non-binding 
 
10 I am construing the kind of process that gives rise to binding commitments as similar to that set out 
in Scanlon’s (1990) account of promising, and Black’s (2004) discussion of whether obligations can be 
incurred through reliance. Both involve a set of conditions that stipulate an obligation to another to φ, 
can only go through when X and Y mutually recognise that Y wants X to φ, and that X is encouraging 
(in some sense) Y to believe that X will φ. Other accounts of promissory obligation state that the 
obligation holding depends on X’s reliance on Y being invited, on the basis that Y recognises that the 
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because you simply don’t care; you are not made vulnerable to him in the manner of a trustor, 
by his promise. You couldn’t truly hold him accountable, except in a disingenuous way, should 
he fail to bring the CD. 
 
Alternatively, imagine that I care about having my colleague’s CD, because I know I can use 
it to mock him with others at work. I do not elicit my colleague’s commitment from deceitful 
means, like the trickster; I simply accept it when he makes the promise, seeing an opportunity 
for some fun at his expense. In this case, again, his commitment is not binding, partly because 
I am not taking him up on the offer in the right spirit, and am not vulnerable to a sense of social 
rejection and so disrupted attachment, should he fail to bring it in. My orientation toward the 
situation is in fact being intent on fuelling the group singling out him. 
 
The point is that commitments do not bind ex nihilo. The machinery of binding commitment 
clicks into place when it matters to us, in a non-instrumental way, that others follow through 
on what they say they will do. This happens when others could display how little they care 
about the fact we are reliant or dependent on them for something, and for this to matter to us 
in a particular way. That particular way is when the security of our attachment to them, or our 
sense of belonging in the group, could be shaken by their (in)action. That’s when the proto-
moralising of trust and distrust kicks into gear. 
 
We can also explain what is going on in the ‘misalignment’ cases where trustors are vulnerable 
to betrayal in spite of explicit trustee commitments to the contrary. To extend the ‘no-strings-
attached’ metaphor; in those misalignment cases, it seemed that trustors tangled themselves on 
loose strings, that explicit commitments were meant to ‘snip’ away. This is because those 
commitments, that were clarified and even accepted by a trustor, do not necessarily have the 
power to override that trustor’s deeper need for secure attachment. In the casual relationship 
case, strings can become attached (one or more participants are susceptible to becoming 
betrayable) despite explicit declarations that they aren’t supposed to be. Over time, one side 
could demonstrate a lack of concern about the other’s felt need for sexual fidelity, simply 
because it may not have been recognised (and presumably not desired) that this need had taken 
root. The process of affiliative bonding that sexual intercourse fuels, can of course creep up on 
casual sexual partners. 
 
Similarly, the veteran was vulnerable just by virtue of being attached to his side; feeling a sense 
of belonging within it.11 Even if he accepted the policy that officer’s safety was priority for his 
side, this again does not override the basic concern he had: that he mattered to the side he was 
attached to. In these misalignment kind of cases, windows of vulnerability become opened, 
that explicitly stated or clarified commitments have limited power to shut. These windows of 
 
matter is practically important to X. (Friedrich & Southwood 2011; Pink 2009; Thomson 1990). The 
point is that promises cannot obligate promisors to actions, that a promisee just does not care about 
being performed. The same is surely true of commitments more generally. 
11 Military units are notoriously closely bonded, and this is often part of the selling point that the military 
uses in attracting potential recruits. 
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vulnerability open up when it is simply possible for the trustee to display how the trustor 
ultimately does not matter that much, and this can be possible just by virtue of the trustor 
becoming attached to the trustee. 
 
In the next section, I address a possible objection to the attachment account. This is the 
objection from non-intimates: non-intimates can trust and betray one another but are often not 
attached. Therefore, the attachment account is false, because attachment is not necessary for 
betrayability. 
 
 
6. Matters of trust with non-intimates 
 
The objection from non-intimates goes as follows: it may seem plausible that an attachment 
concern underpins matters of trust with those we already have close relationships with. But 
what about when we trust strangers/non-intimates? It still matters that non-intimates fulfil our 
trust, even if those are on more mundane or practical matters, and it is still possible that non-
intimates can betray our trust. But it seems less clear that our vulnerability is in a shaken 
attachment to those strangers, because surely, we have no prior attachment to them. 
 
Of course, I grant we can trust those we do not have a personal relationship with. And, matters 
of trust can be about the relatively mundane. You can trust the plumber to fix the boiler, but 
you are not strongly attached to the plumber (even if you are fond of them). As such, if the 
attachment account is meant to explain the vulnerability of any matter of trust, we need to 
square how it is an attachment concern at stake, even in trust or distrust of such non-intimates 
on mundane matters. 
 
My proposal here – which has been foreshadowed – is that we are (often via our close 
attachments), attached more generally to a social group. A sense of secure belonging to a group 
is core to our security and wellbeing. Matters of trust with non-intimates can strike at our 
attachment security, insofar as they reflect the security of our attachment to the group. They 
are windows of vulnerability where others can demonstrate our apparent lack of worth to the 
group. And this makes us betrayable, because we have a social dependence on the group at 
large.  
 
Literature on the negative effect that social isolation has on our wellbeing supports the idea 
that group belonging matters in the deep sense of attachment. For example, Brownlee (2013) 
puts forward a defence in favour of a right to social contact with anyone – not just intimates – 
such that social deprivation is a violation of human rights. In defence of this she cites cases 
that illustrate the effects of social deprivation on astronauts, long-distance solo sailors, and 
prisoners left in solitary confinement. In each case, the effect of isolation constitutes not just 
emotional but also physical harm, such is the strength of the need for social contact. The 
behaviour of individuals subjected to isolation tends to become driven around the procurement 
of interactions with others, with long-distance sailors coming to “depend on radio and video 
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communications for social contact” (2013 pp. 205–6). This is the drive for securing attachment 
to the group, manifesting in desperate ways, in situations of extreme isolation. 
 
Similarly, Cacioppo & Patrick (2008) argue that loneliness and social isolation have a 
profoundly deleterious effect on physical and emotional wellbeing. They suggest that the 
“special balm of acceptance that [social] bonds provide, and the uniquely disturbing pain of 
rejection when they are denied, is what makes humans so highly attuned to social evaluation. 
We care deeply what others think of us, and this is why, of the ten most common phobias that 
cause people to seek treatment, three have to do with social anxiety: fear of speaking in public, 
fear of crowds, fear of meeting new people.” Like Brownlee, they note the punishment of 
banishment/ostracism constitutes “the most severe punishment, short of torture or death,” and 
that this is why in modern prisons, “the penalty of last resort is solitary confinement.” (2008 
pp. 10–1). The lasting effects of isolation take their toll in physical health, even in 
cardiovascular functioning (2008 p. 31), because of the stressful effect of ongoing feelings of 
abandonment resulting from isolation. 
 
In a matter of trust with a non-intimate, she has the capacity to make clear our lack of worth, 
so manifesting our lack of worth to the group more generally. It is in that interaction with her 
we glimpse the possibility of being left behind by others. If a non-intimate is in a position to 
demonstrate concern for us, via fulfilling our reliance on her, then that situation could become 
a matter of trust; we are vulnerable to her in the sense we have a need to be anchored within a 
wider group, of which she is also a member. 
 
It is telling that the effect of being short-changed, let down, or betrayed, in an interaction with 
a non-intimate, will prompt the sort of assurance/soothing seeking behaviour descended from 
that we see in a child left in the strange situation, who seeks reassurance from her returned 
caregiver. We might appeal to those we have close attachments to, such as our friends, to 
validate that what the other person did to us was ‘not on’. What we are doing is seeking the 
comfort of secure bonds, to reassure us of our worth to the group. If our friends don’t validate 
us in that situation, we will be betrayed twice-over; first by the action of the unknown, then by 
our friends. We will likely feel rejection more strongly, as a result of the latter. The close 
relationships we have anchor us in a wider group. 
 
Alternatively, we sometimes require the validation of the group more broadly. Herman (2001) 
notes that the shattering of basic trust experienced in severe trauma, requires validation from 
the community as a whole, to be overcome. When the group fails to recognise and express 
genuine non-instrumental concern for the victim’s standing in the group, the victim can feel 
lingering betrayal and ongoing distress. What the group does to us, and how the group responds 
to what members do to us, matters to us non-instrumentally. It’s plausible to suppose that the 
legal institutions we have to resolve disputes and rule on accusations of harm are, at some level, 
functions of our felt need for validation and assurance from the group. When another exploits 
our position of vulnerability or fails to express the non-instrumental concern we need in such 
a position, we seek the affirmation from the group that we do indeed matter (plus, that the other 
person is made to understand this). But when the group as a whole responds with indifference, 
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or against us, we feel betrayed, because our lack of worth to the group then is communicated 
clearly. 
 
A final bit of support for the proposal that we have a need to belong to a group comes from 
Gudrun (2016), who notes the importance of low level gestures of goodwill and concern in 
neighbourhoods comprised of individuals from diverse backgrounds. Gudrun points out from 
an ethnographic study that, while large diverse neighbourhoods don’t foster many personal 
trust relationships, neighbours place an importance on feeling “safe” (2016 p. 27). A large part 
of this feeling of safety hinges on conventions among residents of expressing minor gestures 
of social contact and recognition, such as nodding or greeting when walking on the same paths, 
fostering feelings of connection among different and relatively unknown individuals (2016 p. 
31). While these neighbours don’t place importance on close trust relationships with their 
neighbours, this isn’t as important to them as the feeling that they themselves matter at a basic 
level to their fellow residents. This enables high levels of basic trust to be upheld, and a sense 
of safety as part of a group, even when surrounded by relative unknowns. 
 
Just because matters of trust between non-intimates appear not to require prior personal 
attachments, this does not entail that our attachment security isn’t the underlying concern in 
our interactions with non-intimates. It just so happens the attachment concern at issue can be 
to the group. Even in the detached exchanges of the marketplace, the possibility of such 
exchanges being construed as matters of trust, means they create the risk of the trustor 
experiencing social rejection. The marketplace, after all, is a space of shared activity, governed 
by rules of fair exchange, buttressed by legal institutions to enforce them. Those rules are a 
reflection of a concern to maintain group cohesion, to ensure that we are validated in cases of 
being victim to another’s betrayal. We need rules that ‘contain’ the fallout of upset that results 
from selfish, disrespectful behaviour, to minimise retaliatory action, so individuals can remain 
assured about engaging in that shared activity. Onora O’Neill remarks that Baier’s view, which 
emphasises interpersonal relationships, is “nostalgic,” and not for “trust in a complex social 
world” (Lagerspetz 2015 p. 49). She fails to recognise that the beating heart of matters of trust, 
in a complex social world, is our need for a sense of belonging to, mattering to, a group, and 
the individuals within it. 
 
The above discussion may explain how matters of trust can be had with those belonging to a 
group we identify with. But what of matters with those who do not belong to a group we 
identify with, as in a ‘state of nature’ case, encountering a complete unknown? My suggestion 
is that such an interaction can still implicate a potential for an attachment, either to the 
individual, or to the group this unknown belongs to. This, combined with the well-supported 
empirical claim that most of us have a disposition to seek out secure attachments (e.g. see the 
long-distance sailors Brownlee refers to), means that we can treat an interaction with a 
complete unknown as a matter of trust. On the other hand, if we are fearful, or wary, of an 
unknown, to the point we don’t open ourselves to the opportunity to receive their help, then we 
may be unable to get the ball rolling on that potential attachment. But it may be that this 
unknown has the ability to help us out anyway, so riding roughshod over our defences that we 
put up, eliciting our attachment regardless. 
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7. The betrayability of distrust 
 
In this final section, I use the attachment account to shed light on why we can be betrayed by 
those we distrust. The answer to this is hinted in the last paragraph of the previous section: it 
can still be important to us that we matter to those who we withdraw from or are wary of. This 
is even if our distrust is pulling us away from them and inclining us toward putting up our 
defences.  
 
There is a feeling of tension in distrusting another. This partly results from an underlying 
concern for belonging we have, combined with the protective urge to pull away, to protect 
ourselves from the one we distrust. The attachment account helps explain this. Those we 
distrust, I suggest, have our attachment concern ‘in their teeth’, perhaps via promises they make 
to us. Consider the accompanying feeling of warmth and relief, when someone we previously 
distrusted, turns out to have our concerns at heart. This motivates the sort of bonding process 
we see, noted by Hawley, when we express sorrow for having previously distrusted another, 
who instead fulfils our trust (2014 p. 3). If there was no attachment concern we had about the 
one we distrusted, prior to being helped by her, then the follow-up process of expressing sorrow 
would not involve the relief that we can trust her. There would be nothing to express relief 
about, because how she regarded us would not previously have mattered in the way it does in 
matters of trust. 
 
Attachment concern underpins distrust, and the attachment account can help explain the claim 
that has been noted previously, that it is possible to be betrayed by those we distrust. We can, 
because we can have attachment concerns about those we distrust. Felt trust is not a pre-
requisite of betrayability. To illustrate this, we can consider a point that Hieronymi (2008) 
makes in defence of the opposite claim. 
 
Hieronymi argues that the degree to which we trustingly believe another will fulfil our reliance 
on her, is also the degree to which we can be betrayed. Hieronymi compares two examples; (i) 
we trust a friend with a secret and “fully believe” that she is trustworthy; (ii) we have doubts 
about our friend who we tell a secret, and merely ‘entrust’ the secret to her.  
 
Suppose in both cases the friend tells our secret to others. Hieronymi claims that in the first 
case, where we had a fully trusting belief in the friend, we are more betrayed than in the second 
case (2008 p. 230). Hieronymi also suggests that we often mitigate the possibility of betrayal 
by mitigating our trusting belief (2008 p. 231), i.e. we tell ourselves we never trusted the friend 
anyway. This is why, she argues, the case of merely entrusting the secret to your friend has 
lesser betrayability than the first case. 
 
But Hieronymi gives no argument for agreeing that we will necessarily feel more betrayed in 
the first case than the second. While it might be right that being distrustful of another can 
incline us to begin the process of detaching from her, which shields us against the painful 
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feelings of betrayal, this is distinct from actually not being vulnerable to feeling betrayed. Put 
simply: distrusting another on a matter doesn’t diminish the extent to which we can be betrayed 
on the matter. Consider Yolanda who strongly suspects her partner Xavier of cheating and is 
nonetheless severely betrayed when her suspicions are confirmed. Perhaps after many repeated 
violations of trust, Yolanda will have begun to detach to the point that the betrayals no longer 
sting. But this is not mitigating the extent of the trust attitude, it is mitigating the extent of her 
attachment.12 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have defended an account of the vulnerability of trust and distrust: the attachment account. 
The attachment account is well suited to explaining what the characteristic vulnerability of 
matters of trust is, so what trust and distrust are at a deeper level about. The account explains 
that matters of trust carry a characteristic interpersonal importance, stemming from an 
underlying need for secure attachments, to individuals and to a group. This attachment concern 
can be implicated in situations where we rely or depend on others, where we also have a 
practical concern about how others act. This is because in matters of trust, another can 
demonstrate their lack of concern about us, by failing to take into account something we care 
about, in their actions. Complete unknowns can elicit our need for secure attachment, through 
promises of help. Overall, matters of trust present to us opposing horizons. Beyond one lies 
increased contentment and a feeling of belonging. Beyond the other lies the pain of rejection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Hieronymi is inconsistent on this issue, as she elsewhere claims that distrust is able to be betrayed 
(2008 p. 229). 
 19 
References 
 
Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1969). ‘Object Relations, Dependency, and Attachment: A Theoretical 
Review of the Infant-Mother Relationship’, Child Development, 40/4: 969–1025. 
DOI: 10.2307/1127008 
Baier, A. (1986). ‘Trust and Antitrust’, Ethics, 96/2: 231–60. 
Black, O. (2004). ‘Reliance and Obligation’, Ratio Juris, 17/3: 269–284. 
Bosmans, G., Braet, C., & Van Vlierberghe, L. (2010). ‘Attachment and symptoms of 
psychopathology: early maladaptive schemas as a cognitive link?’, Clinical 
Psychology & Psychotherapy, 17/5: 374–85. DOI: 10.1002/cpp.667 
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and Loss, Volume I: Attachment. London: The Hogarth Press 
and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 
——. (1973). Attachment and Loss: Volume II: Separation, Anxiety and Anger. London: The 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 
——. (1980). Attachment and Loss, Volume III: Loss, Sadness and Depression. London: The 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 
Brownlee, K. (2013). ‘A Human Right Against Social Deprivation’, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 63/251: 199–222. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.12018 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Patrick, W. (2008). Loneliness: human nature and the need for social 
connection., 1st. ed. New York: Norton. 
Dai, L., Carter, C. S., Ying, J., Bellugi, U., Pournajafi-Nazarloo, H., & Korenberg, J. R. 
(2012). ‘Oxytocin and Vasopressin Are Dysregulated in Williams Syndrome, a 
Genetic Disorder Affecting Social Behavior’, (D. A. Slattery, Ed.)PLoS ONE, 7/6: 
e38513. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0038513 
Dobbs, D. (2007). ‘The Gregarious Brain’. The New York Times Magazine. 
Doyle, T. F., Bellugi, U., Korenberg, J. R., & Graham, J. (2004). ‘“Everybody in the world is 
my friend” hypersociability in young children with Williams syndrome’, American 
Journal of Medical Genetics Part A, 124A/3: 263–73. DOI: 10.1002/ajmg.a.20416 
Friedrich, D., & Southwood, N. (2011). ‘Promises and Trust’. Sheinman H. (ed.) Promises 
and Agreement: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 
Gudrun, J. T. (2016). ‘Neither Trust Nor Distrust’, Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 
6/1: 25–32. DOI: 10.1515/njmr-2016-0009 
Hawley, K. (2014). ‘Trust, Distrust and Commitment’, Noûs, 48/1: 1–20. DOI: 
10.1111/nous.12000 
Herman, J. L. (2001). Trauma and Recovery. Pandora. 
Hieronymi, P. (2008). ‘The reasons of trust’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86/2: 213–
36. DOI: 10.1080/00048400801886496 
 20 
Holton, R. (1994). ‘Deciding to trust, coming to believe’, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 72/1: 63–76. DOI: 10.1080/00048409412345881 
Jackson, R. L. (2000). ‘The Sense and Sensibility of Betrayal: Discovering the Meaning of 
Treachery Through Jane Austen’, Humanitas, 13/2: 72–89. 
Järvinen-Pasley, A., Bellugi, U., Reilly, J., Mills, D. L., Galaburda, A., Reiss, A. L., & 
Korenberg, J. R. (2008). ‘Defining the Social Phenotype in Williams Syndrome: A 
Model for Linking Gene, the Brain, and Behavior’, Development and 
psychopathology, 20/1: 1–35. DOI: 10.1017/S0954579408000011 
Jones, K. (2004). ‘Trust and Terror’. DesAutels P. & Walker M. U. (eds) Moral Psychology: 
Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, pp. 3–18. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Lagerspetz, O. (2015). Trust, ethics, and human reason. London: Bloomsbury Academic, an 
imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2012). ‘An attachment perspective on psychopathology’, 
World Psychiatry, 11/1: 11–5. 
Moseley, T. (2014). ‘What Happens When You Trust Too Much’. The Atlantic. Retrieved 
March 30, 2016, from <http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/05/going-to-
work-with-williams-syndrome/361374/> 
Ng, R., Fillet, P., DeWitt, M., Heyman, G. D., & Bellugi, U. (2015). ‘Reasoning About Trust 
Among Individuals With Williams Syndrome’, American Journal on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities, 120/6: 527–41. DOI: 10.1352/1944-7558-120.6.527 
Pink, T. (2009). ‘Promising and Obligation’, Philosophical Perspectives, 23/1: 389–420. 
Riby, D. M., Kirk, H., Hanley, M., & Riby, L. M. (2014). ‘Stranger danger awareness in 
Williams syndrome’, Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 58/6: 572–82. DOI: 
10.1111/jir.12055 
Scanlon, T. (1990). ‘Promises and Practices’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19/3: 199–226. 
Shklar, J. N. (1984). ‘The Ambiguities of Betrayal’. Ordinary Vices. Harvard University 
Press. 
Strawson, P. F. (1974). Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Methuen: London. 
Thomas, L. (1989). ‘Trust and Survival: Securing a Vision of the Good Society’, Journal of 
Social Philosophy, 20/1–2: 34–41. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1989.tb00005.x 
Thomson, J. J. (1990). ‘Giving One’s Word’. The Realm of Rights. Harvard University Press. 
Wonderly, M. L. (2016). ‘On being attached’, Philosophical Studies, 173/1: 223–42. DOI: 
10.1007/s11098-015-0487-0 
 
